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**RESEARCH ARTICLE**

## What Motivates Us to Go on Strike?

### Social and Moral Norms and their Impact on Strike Participation in Individualist and Collectivist Situations in Western Cultures

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Collective action such as strikes is important for sociopolitical expression. The current study explored cross-cultural differences in the psychology of strikes through an adapted version of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) model. Our model incorporates personal and social-level psychological processes that motivate strike participation and we explored how cultural values and normative nudges moderate these processes. French and American participants received social or moral nudge messages and indicated their intentions to participate in a hypothetical strike. We successfully replicated parts of the TPB model and found that culture and nudge type moderated the relationship between personal attitudes and strike intentions. Our findings highlight the multi-level motivation for and context-sensitive cultural influence on collective action.

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**Keywords:** norms, cross-culture, motivation, Theory of Planned Behavior, strikes

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On May 26, 2018, as I walked out of the metro station “République” in Paris, under the statue commemorating the French Revolution, I witnessed the “Marée Populaire de Paris”—a general strike that assembled 31,700 strikers protesting for their rights. Since 2018, Paris has been replete with social movements against President Macron’s policies. Finding myself amidst a surge of collectivism in an otherwise individualist country, I couldn’t help but wonder: What motivates the French to go on strike? Are they more motivated by their political principles or by peer pressure? Does the history of

socialism and protests in France evoke a particular mindset among the French in regards to strikes?

And if so, how do French strikers compare to American strikers who do not have such a prominent national history of socialist movements? Our study explores how norms and culture influence people’s motivation to go on strike. We first review psychological research on strikes and collective action, and proceed to introduce our model that incorporates both personal and social-level psychological processes behind strike participation. We then review the cultural generalizability of behavioral intentions models and emphasize a contextualized approach to culture upon which we build the cross-cultural component of our model. Finally, we test the validity of our model among French and American participants. Our results highlight the impact of norms and contextualized cultural values on the personal and

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social-level decision-making processes in the psychology of strikes.

### Strikes

“Strike” is a form of collective action and commonly refers to a temporary stoppage of work by employees or organizations in order to gain concessions from authority (Hamann et al., 2013; Hyman, 1989). While earlier research on strikes mostly concerns itself with the economic and political aspects of strikes (Kelly, 1980), there is a growing effort to study the psychological processes of strikes and other forms of collective action (Greijdanus et al., 2020; Postmes et al., 2005; Saint-Laurent et al., 2018; Selvanathan & Jetten, 2020; Sieben et al., 2017; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Many of these studies address the important task of bridging the “subjective (psychological) and social (structural) perspectives on when, why, and how people engage in [collective action such as] social protest” (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 504). Building upon this research, the current study aims to further explore the psychology of strikes. In particular, we treat the psychology of strikes as an interaction between personal (i.e., the individual) and social (i.e., social peers) decision-making processes. An example of a construct that reflects such an interaction are norms, because they not only influence attitudes at the personal level, but can also accentuate a shared social identity at the social level (Bagozzi & Lee, 2002; Thomas et al., 2009; van Bavel et al., 2017, 2020).

In sum, we focus on three aspects of strikes: (a) Motivation, attempt, or act of expressing grievance, protesting against, and obtaining concession from an authority (e.g., the goal of the strike is to demand adequate pay from employers); (b) Refusal to work as a form of organized/group protest (e.g., the method of the strike is to quit work at a planned time with employees who share the same goal); (c) Interaction between personal and group-level psychological decision-making processes (e.g., the motivation to go on strike involves both personal convictions and group norms).

### Norms and Collective Action

The social nature of strikes makes them subject to the influences of norms. Many types of norms have been shown to effectively change social behaviors, from political collective action to responses to the COVID pandemic (Bagozzi & Lee, 2002; Goldstein et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2009; van Bavel et al., 2017, 2020). Research on three types of norms has provided the most

evidence for behavioral changes: social (descriptive) norms, moral (injunctive) norms, and subjective norms. Social (descriptive) norms highlight what one’s social peers do and can motivate behavior through group identification and peer pressure (Cialdini et al., 1990; Thomas et al., 2009; van Bavel, 2007, 2020). In contrast, moral (injunctive) norms prescribe what one should do (Cialdini et al., 1990) or what is the “right” thing to do (van der Linden, 2011) and can motivate behavior through moral principles. Subjective norms refer to one’s perception of social and moral norms and of how much he/she is expected to adhere to these norms (Bagozzi & Lee, 2002) and can motivate behavior through the need for approval and desire to comply.

Therefore, norms provide both social- and personal-level motivation for collective action such as strikes. From the social perspective, norms underly social identity—a core element in psychological models of collective action. For instance, in the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA, Van Zomeren et al., 2008), social identity not only predicts collective action but also bridges other important predictors of collective action such as sense of injustice and efficacy (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Social Identification Model of Collective Action (SIMCA, Van Zomeren et al., 2008)

SIMCA has been successfully replicated in more representative samples (Thomas et al., 2020) and its success emphasizes the essential role of social identity in collective action, and norms are often inseparable from social identity. According to the normative alignment model (Thomas et al., 2009), aligning one’s social identity with norms pertaining to emotion, action, and efficacy is key to sustained motivation for collective action. For example, social norms promote communication and identification among group members and facilitate consensus of action; moral norms accentuate the moral outrage that forges identification with disadvantaged groups which then motivates collective action (Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2019).

From the personal perspective, norms motivate behavioral intentions through conformity and attitude changes. For example, norms are a core component of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1991), a widely used model for predicting individual behavior intentions. In the TPB model, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control (PBC) together motivate behavioral intentions. Here, subjective norms directly influence behavior through perceived normative expectations, and social norms indirectly influence behavior by highlighting social identity which in turn shapes individual attitudes (Thomas et al., 2009). In sum, the norms-identity-attitudes linkage demonstrates the interactions between the group dynamic and the individual decision-making process in collective action.

### **Social Nudges and Moral Nudges**

A cost-effective way to leverage the impact of norms is through normative “nudges”. Nudges are subtle and easy-to-implement behavioral interventions that affect behavior without changing the decision-makers’ incentives (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Normative nudges call attention to different types of norms in order to nudge behaviors in the desired direction (Coventry et al., 2016; Van der Linden, 2018). For instance, participation in anti-littering or climate change campaigns increased when people read messages that highlighted the norm of participation in these campaigns (Nagatsu, 2015; van der Linden, 2018). Similarly, information about others’ healthy-eating habits (Campbell-Avrai et al., 2014; Otto, Davis et al., 2019) and internet privacy choices (Coventry et al., 2016) can nudge these behaviors in norm-adherent directions. While the above-described nudges rely on social norms, other behaviors like altruism and reciprocity are more sensitive to moral norms (Barclay & Willer, 2007). For example, moral norms have been shown to have a large influence on charitable donation (van der Linden, 2011) and adherence to regulations during the pandemic (Van Bavel et al., 2020).

Most normative nudges in the literature are nudges based on social norms, which we will call social nudges. On the other hand, there is little research on nudges based on moral norms, which we will call moral nudges. We aim to compare the behavioral impact of social and moral nudges, and we define the latter as subtle behavioral interventions that draw attention to injunctive moral norms and appeal to moral principles to motivate behavior. Compared to social nudges, moral nudges are relatively less studied in the literature and merits further exploration.

### **Modeling Normative Influences on Behaviors: The TPB Model**

The next step is to model how norms influence and motivate collective action such as strikes. The TPB model, illustrated in figure 2.1, has been successful in predicting behavioral intentions based on subjective norms, attitudes, and PBC (Anderson et al., 2017; Dawson et al., 2015; van Bavel et al., 2017). Since these predictors involve both personal and social psychological processes, the TPB can potentially capture the interactions between social and personal psychological processes in collective action participation.




Figure 2.1. Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991)

While the TPB is traditionally used to predict social-level behavioral intentions, models related to the TPB often include factors that account for social-level normative influences on behaviors. In the current study, we designed our model based on the TPB to illustrate personal and social-level motivations for strike participation by taking into account the TPB’s precursor model and several expanded models.

The TPB’s precursor model, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA, Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), reveals how attitudes and subjective norms are formed. The TRA served as a basis for designing measures of attitudes and subjective norms in our model. In the TRA, illustrated in figure 2.2, attitudes are influenced by behavioral beliefs (beliefs that certain outcomes will follow the intended behaviors), and subjective norms are influenced by normative beliefs (beliefs about whether others approve of a certain behavior). The concept of beliefs can be applied to explain factors in collective action models such as the SIMCA, where injustice can be interpreted as a normative belief and efficacy can be seen as a behavioral belief.




Figure 2.2. Theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)

The TPB also has several expansion models. For instance, given the diversity of norms and their different behavioral effects, van der Linden (2011) added to the input end of the model descriptive norms and injunctive norms (van der Linden, 2011). Christian et al. (2011) modified the output end of the model and explicitly distinguished between social intentions for group activities and personal intentions for individual activities. We incorporated these expansions into our model since they fit well with our goal to account for the social dynamics of collective action (Saint-Laurent et al., 2018; Sieben et al., 2017; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

### **Cultural Generalizability**

Until the late 1900s, psychological research has almost entirely focused on people from white, industrialized, middle-class backgrounds (Henrich et al., 2010). With the emergence of cultural psychology, contemporary research increasingly takes into account cultural generalizability and cultural variations. Cross-cultural studies on the TPB indicate that collectivist cultures are more influenced by social norms while individualist cultures are more influenced by moral norms. Using the TPB to predict sustainable behaviors across cultures, Eom et al. (2016) found that national-level individualism and collectivism best explained differences in sustainable behaviors across 47 countries. More specifically, these authors found that sustainable behaviors tend to be motivated by personal convictions in individualist countries and by norm compliance in collectivist countries. Along similar lines, Van der Linden (2011) found that moral norms were more effective than social norms at motivating charitable behavior in the UK, a conventionally individualist country.

Not all components of the TPB model are equally susceptible to cultural variations, and the main source of cultural difference seems to lie in attitudes and subjective

norms. In a cross-national review of research on the TPB, subjective norms were found to better predict intentions in countries that are more collectivist and that have high power distance (i.e., view power as more unevenly distributed and hierarchical) like China and South Korea (Hassan et al., 2016). Attitudes and norms, compared to PBC, contributed more to cultural differences in health intentions in England and Malaysia (Shukri et al., 2016). A study examining cultural differences in organ donation intentions among Japanese, Koreans, and Americans found that although different components of the TPB influence different aspects of intentions (e.g., signing the donation form, communicating with families, etc.), attitudes are among the most frequent and consistent sources of cultural variances (Bresnahan et al., 2007; Yun & Park, 2010).

The studies discussed above belong to a traditional line of cultural research that tends to treat individualism and collectivism as trait-like and country-bound. Among the 29 cross-national TPB studies that Hassan et al. (2016) reviewed, the most popular countries sampled were the US and the UK for individualist cultures and China and South Korea for collectivist cultures. There seems to be an implicit assumption that British or American participants consistently behave individualistically and that Chinese or South Korean participants consistently behave collectively. However, an emerging trend in cultural psychology suggests the crippling limits of this country-bound approach and advocates for a more contextualized interpretation of culture. When defining cultural psychology, Shweder (1990) argued that “the basic idea of cultural psychology is that no sociocultural environment exists or has identity independent of the way human beings seize meanings and resources from it” (p. 2). In kindred spirit, Leong and Cohen (2001) developed the “culture x person x situation” (CuPS) approach, demonstrating the constant interaction between national culture, situational context, and individual differences. In other words, culture is not equivalent to a country nor always trait-like. Rather, culture is an interaction between a national environment, a situation, and our interpretation of these elements. Similarly, Van Zomeren (2019) suggested that cultural patterns such as power distance and individualism can influence cultural identity and moral values and therefore help elucidate situations in which collective action is more or less likely to occur. Following this context-sensitive trend in cultural research, we adopt the CuPS approach to explore the effects of culture (i.e., individualism-collectivism) and situation (i.e., strikes) on

**Table 1. Interview information for pilot study**

	Age	Career	Social class	Time & Place	Duration	Recorded
JR	50	Theatre producer, part-time theatre professor, independent contract worker	From a poor family, currently middle class	30/05/18, 11hr-12hr30, his house	1.5hrs	With permission
VD	22	Graduated from University of Paris III, Literature major; pursuing a masters in Art	Upper middle class	07/06/18, 14hr15-16hr, Café Victor	1.75hrs	No
EG	22	History and Politics major at University of Paris III	/	07/06/18, 14hr15-16hr, Café near Paris I University	1.75hrs	With permission

*Note.* EG did not specify her social class identification.

how norms motivate strike participation intentions in France and the US.

France and the US are both conventionally Western and individualistic cultures (Taylor & Wolburg, 1998). However, unlike the US, France has a prominent history of socialist movements, including strikes, in which the collective good is valued over individual benefits. In movements such as the French Revolution, the Paris Commune, and the May 1968 manifestations, the working class adopted a collectivist mindset and fought together for their rights. This historical camaraderie plays an important role in French culture and may contribute to a shared social identity that motivates collective action, which may also explain why the French are so known for striking. Therefore, in France, the interaction between cultural values—individualism associated with freedom and collectivism associated with historical socialism—and situation—the coming together during strikes when grievances and historical identities are shared—echoes with Shweder's (1990) interpretation of cultural psychology. That is, the situation of strikes connotes meaning through its association with historical movements that value collectivism and creates a psychological interpretation of this situation that differs from other situations like democratic elections in which individualism is more salient. We tested this theory of

situation-sensitive culture by comparing strike participation in France and the US. To better understand the cultural and psychological impacts of the situation of strikes, we first conducted a pilot study to identify beliefs and values that the French strikers associate with strikes.

### **Pilot Study**

We conducted in-depth interviews with three French strikers in Paris about their motivation to go on strike, addressing two main questions: 1. What beliefs underlie their attitudes and subjective norms? 2. Were they influenced by the French history of socialist movements?

Drawing from research on strikers' attitude formation and norm perception, we designed interview questions addressing attitude development (Bem, 1967; Langford, 1994), political identification (Cameron, 2004), group identification (Akkerman et al., 2013), group rationality (Louis et al., 2016)—a model in which an individual chooses group identity above individual cost-benefit considerations—and class struggle (Lenin, 1914).

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

We obtained consent to interview one independent contract worker and two students at the University of Paris III. Table 1 shows the details of the interviews.

### Procedure and Material

We designed a semi-structured interview on strikers' motivation to go on strike (see Appendix A). The participants generally guided the conversation direction as long as they addressed these four general themes: demographics, motivation for strike participation including attitudes and subjective norms, beliefs that formed their attitudes and subjective norms, and the influence of socialist movements in French history on their strike participation.

### Results and Discussion

We transcribed each interview and analyzed them according to the above-mentioned four themes and **bolded** the relevant psychological construct in the participants' responses (See Appendix B).

The strikers we interviewed were mainly motivated by the expected positive results of strikes, suggesting that their positive attitude towards strikes was influenced by behavioral beliefs (TRA) as well as the sense of efficacy (SIMCA). All participants valued the strike's impact on the collective societal good, offering preliminary support for the collectivist mindset regarding strikes among French strikers. Two participants were more motivated by social norms while the other one was more motivated by political principles. Nevertheless, this last participant self-identified as a utopist, and therefore his participation in collective action against inequality can be interpreted as, in terms of SIMCA (Thomas et al., 2009), an alignment between social identity and social norms among utopists. While all participants identified with their fellow strikers, two participants were only comfortable going on strikes with their friends. This suggests two levels of social identity and normative influence: a macro-level one involving all the strikers and an interpersonal-level one involving close friends.

### The Current Study

The current study aims to address both personal and social-level decision-making processes involved in collective action through examining the influence of norms, cultural values, and personal attitudes on strike participation. To that end, we made several modifications to Ajzen's (1991) TPB model based on its precursor model, the TRA, its expansion models, related collective action models like the SIMCA, and the findings from our pilot study. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate our model. On the input end of the model, we excluded PBC since it was less sensitive to cultural variations compared to subjective norms and attitudes (Bresnahan et al., 2007;

Hassan et al., 2016; Shukri et al., 2016; Yun & Park, 2010). On the output end of the model, we measured social intentions in addition to individual intentions to better capture the social aspect of strikes. To further integrate the social and personal perspectives of collective action, we gave participants normative nudges that either increased the salience of social or moral norms, which in turn should strengthen the effect of these norms on intentions by highlighting social norms, and moral nudges should emphasize the role of attitudes on intentions by highlighting moral norms or personal principles. Finally, we implemented a cross-cultural design and explored the CuPS approach to culture by comparing strike participation in France and the US. We used the Singelis' Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994) to measure individualism and collectivism because it aligns with the CuPS approach: it measures independence (individualism) and interdependence (collectivism) on two separate subscales, implying that one can be both individualist and collectivist rather than having a unidimensional trait-like cultural value. To compare the cultural values between the two countries, we compared the two subscale scores *between* French and American participants. To measure how the situation of strikes can influence individualist and collectivist values within a country, we compared the two subscale scores *within* each country.




Figure 3.1. Moderation of nudges and culture on the relationship between Attitudes and Intentions




Figure 3.2. Moderation of nudges and culture on the relationship between Subjective Norms and Intentions

Participants read a hypothetical scenario about an

upcoming strike. They either received no nudge, a social nudge or a moral nudge, and indicated their attitudes and subjective norms regarding the strike as well as their intention to join the strike. We hypothesized that:

1. We will partially replicate the TPB model in which attitudes and subjective norms predict strike participation intentions.
2. There will be a main effect of nudges on strike participation intentions.
3. French participants will score higher on collectivism than American participants.
4. The relationship between attitudes and intentions will be stronger in the US and

under the moral nudge condition.

5. The relationship between subjective norms and intentions will be stronger in France and under the social nudge condition.

## Method

### Participants

According to an *a priori* power analysis, we needed a sample size of  $N=180$  to have 80% power to detect a small to medium-sized effect with a 0.05 criterion for statistical significance. We recruited 91 French and 91 American participants eligible for our study through Qualtrics. All participants satisfied six eligibility criteria: participants (a)

**Table 2. Descriptive data for participants for the current study**

	French		American	
	N	%	N	%
<b>N=</b>	90	100	91	100
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	53	58.9	19	20.9
Female	37	41.1	72	79.1
<b>Age in France/US</b>				
Since 0-2yrs	85	94.4	90	98.9
Since 2-4yrs	5	5.6	1	1.1
<b>Most Common SES</b>				
Poor (France)/lower class (US)	8	8.9	12	13.2
Populaire (France)/lower-middle class (US)	32	35.6	49	53.8
Middle class (France and US)	47	52.2	14	15.4
Aisé (France)/upper-middle class (US)	3	3.3	15	16.5
Upper Class	/	/	1	1.1
<b>Most Common Highest Education</b>				
Secondary education	24	26.7	/	/
Some sort of College	/	/	35	38.5
Bachelor's	29	32.2	29	31.9
<b>Work status</b>				
Full-time	77	85.6	57	62.2
Part-time	13	14.4	34	37.8
<b>Cultural identification</b>				
French	77	85.6	/	/
Both French and other cultures*	13	14.4	/	/
American	/	/	64	70.3
Other ethnic American	/	/	27	29.7
<b>Marital Status</b>				
Married	44	48.9	63	69.2
Single	46	51.1	28	30.8

*Note.* One French participant who self-identified as Latino American was deleted from the sample, since the study assumes that the French participants are culturally French. Therefore,  $N = 90$  for French participants.

are at least familiar with the concept of strikes; (b) hold non-managerial positions so they are more likely to be involved in strikes; (c) have *never* worked at the hotels involved in the scenario and do *not* have friends or family working at the hotels in managerial positions to avoid bias and conflict; (d) have lived in France or US since the age of four or younger; (e) are employed and have at least one close colleague in order to realistically answer the survey questions; (f) are aged between 18 and 30 to control for age and work experience. The current study received Institutional Review Board approval for exemption. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the participants.

### **Procedure**

The current study employed a 3 (social norms, moral norms, control) × 2 (France, US) design. The entire procedure was presented online through Qualtrics. Participants read an announcement of an upcoming strike at a hotel in their country. They were prompted to imagine themselves as employees of the hotel, demanding higher wages and better working conditions. They were randomly assigned to one of three conditions such that the above prompt was followed by a social nudge message, a moral nudge message, or no message. They then indicated their intentions to join the upcoming strike before answering questions about their attitudes and subjective norms and completing the cultural scale.

### **Materials (See appendix C and D)<sup>1</sup>**

**Hypothetical scenarios.** Two short passages providing background information on recent strikes were edited to have similar lengths and content (e.g., location, goals, etc.). The passage for American participants was about the Marriott Hotel strikes in San Francisco, adapted from the California Labor Federation website, in English; and the one for French participants was about the Park Hyatt Hotel strikes in Paris, adapted from the Figaro news website, in French.

**Nudges.** The social nudge message was “Data has shown that up till now, 75% of the workers in Marriott (US)/Park Hyatt (France) hotel in San Francisco (US)/Paris (France) went on strike during the past two weeks.” The moral nudge message was “We have the moral responsibility to participate in movements that promote social well-being.”

**Demographics.** Demographic information included the participants’ age, gender, ethnic identity, socioeconomic status, education level, and their experience with strikes and with the above-mentioned hotels.

**Intentions.** Participants indicated their intention to join the upcoming strike in the next two weeks from one of the four choices: not going on strike; going on strike only if their close colleagues go on strike; going on strike if the majority of hotel employees go on strike; going on strike regardless of others.

**Attitudes and Subjective Norms.** Six items measured subjective norms, including beliefs about social identity and the country’s history (e.g., “My going on strike is supported by the history of socialist movements/democratic protests in France/the US”); beliefs about normative expectations (e.g., “Most people who are important to me would believe that I should go on strike for the hotel”); and beliefs about the collective nature of strikes (e.g., “I would want to go on strike for the Marriott Hotel with all of the employees who went on strike during the past two weeks”). Seven items measured attitudes, including behavioral beliefs (e.g., “Going on strike means that the hotel will agree to provide for workers adequate payment”); and efficacy beliefs given individualist/collectivist values (e.g., “My participation in strike will contribute to the good of my personal well-being/the good of the society”).

**Individualism and Collectivism.** Individualist and collectivist values were measured with the Singelis’ Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994).

### **Results**

All analyses were performed using SPSS Version 25.

#### **Preliminary analysis**

**Scale Reliability.** For the French sample, the Attitudes scale consisted of 6 items ( $\alpha = .75$ ), and the Subjective Norms scale consisted of 5 items ( $\alpha = .81$ ). Questions 1 and 3 were deleted to maximize reliability.

For the American sample, the Attitudes scale consisted of 4 items ( $\alpha = .88$ ), and the Subjective Norms scale consisted of 5 items ( $\alpha = .88$ ). Questions 3, 11, 12, and 13 were deleted to increase reliability.

The Attitudes scale in the two samples consisted of

<sup>1</sup>Other than the two edited passages in their original languages, all other materials were written in English and back-translated between English and French by an English-French bilingual speaker.



different items because otherwise, the scale would not be reliable ( $\alpha = .52$ ). The Subjective Norms scale was reliable for both the French and the American sample and consisted of the same 5 items.

**Descriptive Statistics.** The number of French participants who would go on strike regardless of others ( $N = 14$ , 15.6%) doubled the number of American participants who would behave similarly ( $N = 7$ , 7.7%). Conversely, the number of American participants who would not go on strike at all ( $N = 26$ , 28.6%) doubled the number of French participants who would behave similarly ( $N = 12$ , 13.3%). More French participants have heard of the Park Hyatt hotel strike ( $N = 28$ , 31.1%) than American participants have heard of the Marriott hotel strike ( $N = 8$ , 8.9%). A third of the French participants and a fifth of the American participants found the scenario very realistic.

### Main Analysis

**1. Replication of the TPB.** A direct logistic regression was performed on binary strike intentions as outcome and subjective norms and attitudes as predictors. A test of the full model with both predictors against a constant-only model was statistically significant,  $\chi^2(2, N = 181) = 53.62$ ,  $p < .001$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .399$ , Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2(7, N = 181) = 7.31$ ,  $p = .50$ , indicating that the predictors, as a set, significantly distinguished between intention to and not to go on strike.

Table 3 shows regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios for both attitudes and subjective norms. According to the Wald criterion, both subjective norms ( $B = 1.44$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $OR = 4.24$  [95% CI: 2.55, 7.04]) and attitudes ( $B = .40$ ,  $p = .03$ ,  $OR = 1.49$  [95% CI: 1.04, 2.14]) significantly predicted the intention to go on strike.

**2. Main effect of the nudges.** A direct logistic regression was performed on binary strike intentions as outcome and nudge type as a categorical predictor. Social nudge and moral nudge conditions were compared against the control condition.

A test of the full model with all social and moral nudge

conditions was compared against the control condition. Compared with the control, neither the social nudge ( $B = .62$ ,  $p = .17$ ,  $OR = 1.85$  [95% CI: .77, 4.46]) nor the moral nudge ( $B = .52$ ,  $p = .24$ ,  $OR = 1.68$  [95% CI: .71, 3.98]) had a significant main effect on the intentions. That is, nudge messages did not produce higher likelihood of strike participation.

**3. Individualism-Collectivism.** An independent-samples t-test was calculated for the average independence score (i.e., individualism) and interdependence score (i.e., collectivism) between the American and French participants. There was no significant difference between the American sample ( $M = 4.62$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ ) and the French sample ( $M = 4.68$ ,  $SD = .95$ ) in individualism,  $t(179) = -.37$ ,  $p = .71$ , with a very small effect size, Cohen's  $d = .10$  (95% CI: .06, 0.14), confirming the lack of significance. Nor was there a significant difference between the American sample ( $M = 4.49$ ,  $SD = .92$ ) and the French sample ( $M = 4.62$ ,  $SD = .93$ ) in collectivism,  $t(179) = -.96$ ,  $p = .34$ , with a very small effect size, Cohen's  $d = .10$  (95% CI: .06, .14), confirming the lack of significance.

A paired-samples t-test was calculated for the difference between independence and interdependence scores within the two samples. The mean difference between individualism and collectivism for both the American sample ( $M = .13$ ,  $SD = .73$ ,  $t(90) = 1.73$ ,  $p = .09$ ) and the French sample ( $M = .05$ ,  $SD = .69$ ,  $t(89) = .75$ ,  $p = .46$ ) was not significant. Correspondingly, the effect size was small for both the American sample, Cohen's  $d = .10$  (95% CI: .06, .14), and the French sample, Cohen's  $d = .10$  (95% CI: .06, .14).

**4. Moderation of culture and nudge type on attitudes.** A sequential logistic regression was performed on strike intentions as outcome, subjective norms as predictor, and culture and nudge types as moderators.

The model did not fit well on the basis of attitudes

**Table 3. Logistic Regression for Attitudes, Subjective Norms and Strike Intentions**

Source	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	Wald $\chi^2$	<i>p</i>	<i>OR</i>	95% <i>CI OR</i>
Subjective norms	1.444	.259	31.114	.000	4.238	[3.26, 5.53]
Attitudes	.398	.185	4.650	.031	1.489	[0.18, 0.83]

Note. *OR* = odds ratio. *CI* = confidence interval.

**Table 4. Moderation of Culture and Nudge Type between Attitudes and Intentions**

Source	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	<i>Wald</i> $\chi^2$	<i>p</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>95% CI OR</i>
Attitudes	1.443	.401	12.933	.000	4.233	[1.928, 9.294]
US	.398	.185	8.084	.004	59.024	[3.550, 981.480]
Control			8.493	.041		
Social nudge	3.225	1.480	4.571	.029	25.158	[1.384, 457.258]
Moral nudge	4.033	1.580	6.513	.011	56.411	[2.549, 1248.491]
Attitudes*US	-1.333	.377	12.511	.000	.264	[.126, .552]
Attitudes*Control			6.913	.032		
Attitudes*Social	-.770	.403	3.648	.056	.463	[.210, 1.020]
Attitudes*Moral	-1.006	.418	5.803	.016	.366	[.161, .829]

*Note.* US is compared to France as reference, and both social and moral nudge types are compared to the control as reference

alone,  $\chi^2(1, N = 181) = 2.04, p = .15$ , indicating that attitudes alone do not significantly distinguish between intentions to and not to go on strike. After the addition of the two moderators, culture and nudge type,  $\chi^2(3, N = 181) = 7.02, p = .07$ , the new model based on all three factors (attitudes, culture, and nudge type), although not significant, proved a better model fit. The further addition of the interaction between attitudes and culture,  $\chi^2(1, N = 181) = 12.61, p < .001$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .18$ , Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2(8, N = 181) = 10.38, p = .24$ , revealed a significant interaction/moderation effect of culture on the relationship between attitudes and intentions. The addition of the interaction between attitudes and nudge type,  $\chi^2(2, N = 181) = 7.96, p = .02$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .24$ , Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2(8, N = 181) = 9.44, p = .31$ , indicated a significant interaction/moderation effect of nudge type on the relationship between attitudes and intentions above and beyond the moderation of culture.

Table 4 shows the regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios for attitudes, social nudge, moral nudge, and interactions between attitudes and said two nudges. Both social and moral nudge conditions were compared to the control. According to the Wald criterion, attitudes significantly predict intentions,  $B = 1.44, p < .001, OR = 4.23$  (95% CI: 1.93, 9.29). Controlling for attitudes, American participants were slightly more likely to go on

strike than French participants,  $B = 4.08, p < .004, OR = 59.02$  (95% CI: 3.55, 981.48). Controlling for both attitudes and culture, both social nudges ( $B = 3.23, p = .03, OR = 25.16$  [95% CI: 1.384, 457.258]) and moral nudges ( $B = 4.03, p = .01, OR = 56.41$  [95% CI: 2.55, 1248.49]) significantly predicted a higher likelihood of strike participation than the control. However, given the massive confidence intervals that cover hundreds and even thousands of units, the resulting odds ratios of social and moral nudges had very low precision.

For the moderations of culture on the relationship between attitudes and intentions to go on strike,  $B = -1.33, p < .001, OR = .25$  (95% CI: .13, .55), the beta-weight suggests that compared to the French participants, every one unit increase in attitudes in the American participants resulted in 1.33 unit decrease in the log of the odds of strike participation. In other words, the same attitudes rating predicted less likelihood of strike participation for the American participants compared to their French counterparts.

For the moderation of nudge type, in the social nudge condition, attitudes predicting the log of odds of going on strike did not differ significantly from the control ( $p = .056$ ). In the moral nudge condition,  $B = -1.01, p = .02, OR = .37$  (95% CI: .16, .55), the beta-weight suggests that, compared to the French participants, every one unit increase in attitudes in the American participants resulted

in 1.01 decrease in the log of odds of strike participation compared to the control. In other words, for the American participants, the same attitudes rating predicted less likelihood of strike participation under the moral nudge condition than social nudge condition.

**5. Moderation of culture and nudge type on subjective norms.** A sequential logistic regression was performed on strike intentions as outcome, subjective norms as predictor, and culture and nudge type as moderators.

There was a good model fit on the basis of subjective norms alone,  $\chi^2(1, N = 181) = 48.72, p < .001$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .37$ , Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2(8, N = 181) = 15.42, p = .05$ , indicating that subjective norms alone significantly distinguished between intention to and not to go on strike regardless of country or condition.

After adding the two moderators, culture and nudge type, the step  $\chi^2(2, N = 181) = 9.51, p = .02$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .43$ , Hosmer and Lemeshow  $\chi^2(8, N = 181) = 10.01, p = .11$ , the results indicated that the moderators could significantly distinguish between intention to go on strike above and beyond subjective norms.

The addition of the interaction between subjective norms and culture, the step  $\chi^2(1, N = 181) = .05, p = .83$ , indicated that there was no significant interaction/moderation effect of culture on the relationship between subjective norms and intentions.

The addition of the interaction between subjective norms and nudge type, the step  $\chi^2(1, N = 181) = 1.03, p = .60$ , indicated that there was no significant interaction/moderation effect of nudge type on the relationship between subjective norms and intentions.

## Discussion

The current study explored cultural differences in the social and personal psychological processes of collective action by comparing strike participation intentions among French and American participants. In addition, we explored how individualism/collectivism and normative nudges influenced their intentions. Adapting from the TPB model and its related models, we tested a model in which attitudes and subjective norms predict strike participation intentions, moderated by nudge type and culture. We hypothesized that participants who received a nudge message would be more motivated to go on strike in general. In addition, we expected that reading about strikes would highlight collectivist values for French participants but less so for American participants, so that the former would be more motivated to go on strike by subjective norms and social nudges and the latter by their attitudes towards strikes and moral nudges. Confirming

our first hypothesis, we successfully replicated parts of the TPB model. Our second hypothesis was partially supported—controlling for culture and attitudes, participants who received nudges were more likely to go on strike. Contrary to our third hypothesis, we did not find significant cultural differences, but we discuss below how our results can still support the situation-sensitive perspective on culture. Our fourth hypothesis unexpectedly found support in the opposite direction—attitudes predicted a lower likelihood of going on strike for the American participants and under the moral nudge condition. Our last hypothesis was not supported; we found no moderation effect of culture and nudge type on the relationship between subjective norms and intentions.

Our replication of the TPB contributes to its success in predicting behavioral intentions while our adaptation of the TPB to predict collective action responds to Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) challenge to bridge the individual and social perspective of collective action. While the TPB traditionally focuses on individual activities, we added to the model components that capture social-level psychological processes like normative nudges, behavioral beliefs about the efficacy and sociohistorical identity, and social behavioral intentions (Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In other words, our model connects the TPB literature with collective action models such as SIMCA and the normative alignment model through the contextualization of behavioral motivation in social environments. In applied settings, our study can potentially contribute to strategies that motivate meaningful collective action such as strikes, protests, or campaigns that bring about positive social changes.

Normative nudges increased strike participation intentions only after controlling for attitudes and culture, and with very low precision. This suggests a potential overestimation of the success of nudges in the past literature. Some studies suggested that nudges may backfire depending on the inference participants make about the choices they are given (Krijnen et al., 2018). For instance, since we provided four options in the intentions question, participants may have interpreted the two middle options as more neutral and therefore chose these two options regardless of the nudge message. Another explanation may be the heterogenous education levels in our sample compared to samples in previous studies. For instance, consider Van der Linden's (2011) study in which moral norms motivated charitable donations. Although our moral nudge message

resembled his, his sample was homogeneously highly educated—over 90% of the participants received college education and above—while only 60% of our participants (in each country) had college degrees, and the other 40% had diverse educational backgrounds. Similarly, in other studies that champion the success of social nudges, participants were often drawn from homogeneously educated populations such as university students (Campbell-Avrai et al., 2014), or their education level was not mentioned (Otto et al., 2019). Therefore, the normative nudges may not be so effective in our study because our participants were less sensitive to norms than highly-educated populations. Future research on nudges could explore whether nudge designs catering to the education level of a target audience can produce stronger motivational effects.

There was no significant difference between individualism and collectivism, neither between nor within the two samples. However, since the “individualist self” can be separate from the “collectivist self” (Singelis, 1994), that the French sample scored similarly on individualism as the American sample does not necessarily mean that the situation of strikes failed to increase the French’s sense of collectivism. That is, it is possible that the French increased in collectivist values while maintaining their individualism. As for the lack of significant difference in collectivism scores between the two samples, one possible explanation is that thinking about strikes engendered a surge of collectivism not only for the French but also for the American participants. Although Americans may not have a strong historical identification with strikes as the French do, they may still have been moved by the collective camaraderie associated with strikes, and thereby scored similarly to the French on collectivism. The lack of individualism-collectivism difference within each country may be due to the fact that the Singelis’ Self-Construal Scale (1994) was not primarily designed for within-country comparison. Alternatively, if participants from both countries were more individualist (than collectivist) *a priori*, as per conventional cultural values, then reading about strikes may have made them more collectivist and reduced the difference between their individualism and collectivism scores.

Our cross-cultural design echoed Van Zomeren’s (2019) proposal for cross-cultural research in collective action. Despite the lack of statistical significance, our results nonetheless highlighted the need for more nuances in the interpretation and operationalization of culture. In line with CuPS (Leung & Cohen, 2011) and Van

Zomeren’s (2019) proposal that cultural values and social identity interact to influence collective action, our cross-cultural design reflects the interaction between situation (strikes), social identity (history of strikes in France) and cultural values (individualism/collectivism). If the above explanations are valid and thinking about strikes *did* elicit participants’ collectivist mindset, our results can encourage this context-sensitive cultural approach and change preconceptions about Western cultures and how to operationalize them in general.

Culture and nudge type successfully moderated the relationship between attitudes and intentions, but in the *opposite* direction of our hypothesis. The same attitudes rating predicted *less* rather than more likelihood of strike participation a) for the American compared to the French participants, and b) under the moral nudge compared to the social nudge and control conditions. While the lack of main effects of nudges and of cultural difference may explain why we did not find the hypothesized interaction, they do not account for the opposite-direction effects. The opposite-direction cultural moderation could be explained by the different base-rate for strike participation in our two samples which may have masked the influence of attitudes. We found that the French were both quantitatively and qualitatively more willing to go on strike than the Americans: fewer American participants intended to go on strike in general whereas much more French participants intended to go on strike regardless of others. Another potential explanation involves the degree of realism. A third of the French participants compared to just a fifth of the American participants found the hypothetical strike scenario very realistic, perhaps because more French participants have heard of the strike in the scenario than their American counterparts. Realistic scenarios may have accentuated social norms, which then facilitated alignment of identity with the norms (Thomas et al., 2009) and thereby motivated more French participants to go on strike regardless of their attitudes. Future studies can further investigate the moderating effect of realism on behavioral intentions. Finally, although our study did not use real events nor test actual behaviors, there is still value in studying hypothetical events and behavioral intentions since they are inevitable in life (e.g., “Would I make commuting arrangements in case of an upcoming strike?”).

On the other hand, the opposite-direction nudge moderation might have resulted from design flaws in the moral nudge message or the Attitudes scale. Our moral nudge message about the “social responsibility” of strike

participation may have emphasized too much on obligation (e.g., *the society believes that I should go on strike*) instead of on personal principles—*I believe that I should go on strike*. Our moral nudge could have been more effective had we emphasized personal principles which can better integrate personal identity with social norms (Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren, 2008). In addition, nudges sometimes backfire: the Netherlands government set organ donation as the default option to nudge people to donate organs. This nudge then unexpectedly led to a decrease in organ donation because people felt manipulated by the government (Krijnen et al., 2008). Perhaps our American participants also felt manipulated by the moral nudge and wanted to “rebel” against it. Alternatively, the different items in the Attitudes scale for American and French participants may have led to the opposite effect of attitudes on intentions. In order to adjust for reliability, three items related to personal emotions (i.e., “my going on strike is foolish...wise; negative...positive; punishing...rewarding”) were included in the Attitudes scale for the French but not for the American sample. On the other hand, items in the Attitudes scale for the American sample were more impersonal (e.g., “my going on strike would contribute to workers’ adequate pay ...”). These items emphasize the strike’s influence on workers in general but not the participant per se, and consequently may not have fully captured participants’ personal motivation to go on strike as we expected.

Our findings thus caution researchers and designers of nudges to anticipate the inferences people may make about word choices in survey questions and nudge messages. As seen in our results and the Netherlands organ donation nudge, nuances in nudge design may lead to unexpected social inferences and produce potentially adverse effects. These adverse effects should be avoided for larger-scale movements. Our results also revealed a potential research gap in the discrepancy between personal attitudes and impersonal attitudes in motivating collective action.

Finally, contrary to our fifth hypothesis, nudge type and culture did not moderate the relationship between subjective norms and intentions. Subjective norms predicted similar likelihood of strike participation regardless of culture and nudge type. This could be due to the inherent salience of subjective norms in strikes. We hypothesized that social nudges would highlight subjective norms. However, if subjective norms were already salient given the strong social connotation of strikes and the strong social identification among strikers,

there would be a ceiling effect such that social nudges could no further increase the salience of subjective norms. This explanation corresponds to the fact that American and French participants scored similarly on collectivism, reflecting yet again the power of situation over cultural values and the fluidity of cultural constructs. In fact, the context of strikes could be why our findings did not conform with previous studies in which subjective norms better motivated behaviors in collective cultures (Eom et al., 2016, Hassan et al., 2016; Shukri et al., 2016). These studies did not involve norm-salient behaviors, nor did they consider situation as a variable.

### Limitations

The two primary limitations of our study are its relatively small sample size and the lack of pilot testing for the scales. With a larger sample size, we could perform a structural equation model in which attitudes and subjective norms interact with each other and the moderators.

The scales we developed could benefit from further testing. Although the items in the scales were based on a qualitative pilot study and were adequately reliable, the pilot study was only conducted in France with just three participants. This may have biased the items towards French participants and excluded a wider range of psychological phenomena involved. Furthermore, a pilot test of the scales could have revealed some design flaws and perhaps produced more significant main effects and moderation effects.

### Conclusion

Our study attempted to bridge the personal and social perspectives of people’s motivation for strike participation by adapting the TPB model to align with collective action models like the SIMCA and normative alignment models. Our successful replication and adaptation of the TPB not only contributed to the generalizability of the TPB in collective domains, but also faced up to a challenge in the literature to combine personal and social aspects of collective action. By adopting the CuPS approach in our cross-cultural design, we aimed to expand the meaning of culture by demonstrating how cultural values vary with situational context. Finally, we suggested that attending to contextual, cultural, and linguistic nuances in survey and nudge designs can improve our understanding of how and when normative nudges best motivate collective action and thus help us more efficiently nudge others to participate in positive social actions around the globe.

## Conflicts of Interest

The author has no conflicts of interest to declare.

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## Appendix A Interview questions for pilot interviews in France

### **Demographics**

1. Vous travaillez dans quel domaine et depuis combien de temps?
2. Pourriez-vous me parler un peu de votre expérience personnelle des manifestations et/ou des grèves ? Depuis quand? Souvent?
3. En général est-ce que vous êtes organisateur ou participant ?
4. A votre avis, est-ce que les manifestations et les grèves sont plutôt similaires ou différentes ? Comment ? Dans quelles situations sont-elles les plus efficaces ? Et selon quels critères ?

### **Motivation to go on strike: attitudes and subjective norms**

5. Quelles sont/quelles étaient vos raisons principales et vos motivations pour participer?
  - a. Est-ce que vous y participez toujours avec des opinions ou des principes clairs? Est-ce que la participation a eu un impact sur vos opinions ? Si oui, comment (clarifier, fortifier, changer) ?
  - b. Qui sont les autres participants? A votre avis, quelles sont leurs motivations de participer? (Sont-ils des volontariats? Sinon, comment sont-ils recrutés?)
    - i. Quelle est la relation entre vous et les autres grévistes et manifestants ? Est-ce que vous êtes plutôt des « camarades » politiques? Des amis? Des collègues professionnel(le)s? Est-ce que vous avez ( ?) une identification collective? Si oui, c'est quoi?
    - ii. Est-ce qu'ils font partie de vos motivations pour participer aux grèves et manifs?
    - iii. Est-ce que vous auriez fait les mêmes manifestations et grèves si vous étiez seul, sans le soutien des autres ?
6. Pourriez-vous décrire vos émotions pendant une manifestation ou une grève?
7. Est-ce que vos émotions changent ou évoluent avant, pendant et après la grève?

### **Attitudes (continued): behavioral beliefs**

8. Est-ce que les grèves et les manifs auxquelles vous participez ont eu des résultats ? Si oui, quelles sortes de résultats ? (positifs/négatifs, comme prévus/surprenants, concrets/symboliques, etc.)



9. Est-ce que votre participation a changé votre manière de voir la société ou la politique, ou même changé votre style de vie ?
10. Vous croyez qu'il soit possible de trouver un équilibre entre les inconvénients que causent les grèves et les demandes des grévistes ?

**Subjective Norms (Continued): Class consciousness, History of France**

11. Dans mes recherches, on focalise beaucoup sur le développement de la conscience de classe – l'identification avec une classe sociale (e.g. travailleurs) contre une autre classe (e.g. capitalistes). Est-ce que vous avez eu de telles expériences?
12. Croyez-vous qu'il y ait une « tradition » ou une histoire de faire des grèves et des manifestations en France ? Si oui, est-ce que cela impacte votre décision d'aller en grève/faire une manif ? Sinon, pareil?
13. Que pensez-vous des gens qui ne font pas la grève ?

Appendix B Interview transcription and analysis from the pilot study  
**Interview with JP**

**Strike Experience**

Il participe aux manifestations depuis qu'il avait une vingtaine d'années. Il est en général le participant mais espère devenir un leader des manifs. Il fait des posts sur FaceBook et envoie des messages aux gens pour les encourager et inciter à participer aux manifs. **(question2)**

**Political context**

En France, on avait des services publics (de la santé, de l'éducation, l'UNEDIC, etc.), mais le gouvernement de Macron est en train de réduire ces services pour un système plus libéral comme celui aux Etats-Unis et en Angleterre (la réforme de Thatcher). Ce dernier est un système qui matérialise et asservit les gens afin de gagner plus d'argent.

**Motivations—ATTITUDES OR BEHAVIORAL BELIEFS**

Raisons pratiques ou personnelles : JP veut surtout défendre l'UNEDIC car il a droit aux allocations de chômage. Il veut d'abord garantir la sécurité financière de sa famille (sa femme et ses deux filles). **(Results of personal gain)**

JP a développé sa conscience politique dès son jeune âge. Il avait des amis plus âgés qui l'ont pris sous leurs ailes. Il avait des opinions politiques claires et fortes depuis qu'il avait une vingtaine d'années— « c'est un instinct de survivre » pour lui. Ses opinions et principes ont toujours été les mêmes, mais la participation dans les manifs l'a aidé à clarifier ses idées. **(Clarification of opinions towards strike)**

**Motivations—NORMATIVE BELIEFS AND MORAL NORMS**

Raisons idéologiques : Pour JP, « la priorité est de vivre une vie heureuse », en sachant sa place en tant qu'individu et dans la collectivité. Il faut se demander dans quel monde est-ce qu'on veut vivre et travailler ? Quel avenir est-ce qu'on envisage pour nos enfants ? Il faut lutter pour ce monde-ci. Il ne s'agit pas de détruire tout le système libéral, mais de préserver ce qu'il y a de bien dans ce dernier.

JP a développé une conscience de classe. Pour lui, les manifestations sont toujours des luttes entre deux classes sociales, car on ne peut pas sortir de sa propre classe sociale. C'est une lutte du peuple contre les riches. Selon lui, « le peuple est capable d'un sens d'humanité » alors que les riches matérialisent tout. Le peuple doit avoir le pouvoir de choisir son propre « modèle de société ». **(The people wants to fight for a fairer society.)**

Il n'y a pas de dialogue avec le gouvernement. Les manifestants et les grévistes n'ont pas eu de résultat positif pour le moment. Des fois, JP trouve que cela ne vaut pas la peine de continuer. Mais le fait de continuer lui donne plus de motivation. **(Self Perception Theory)**

JP est déçu car il croit qu'il n'y a pas assez de manifestants. Les gens pensent d'une manière trop individuelle ; ils ne se rendent pas compte des problèmes politiques et sociaux. Ils focalisent sur la propriété. Pour sauvegarder leur propriété, ils ne font pas de sacrifice pour un meilleur système politique. Pour JP, il faut accepter de perdre financièrement, et faire du sacrifice pour une cause collective. Si les manifestations et les grèves causent des inconvénients, « c'est comme ça ». Par exemple, JP n'est pas fâché par les grèves de SNCF, car il croit qu'il faut faire des sacrifices pour une cause plus grande. **(Feeling a collective identification with all the people and organizations that go on strike; the obligation to fight for a greater cause.)**

JP croit qu'il faut réveiller la conscience collective et politique des gens. Il voit le théâtre et l'art comme moyens d'éduquer et de provoquer les gens.

Les jeunes aujourd'hui possèdent une bonne énergie, mais il faut savoir où diriger cette énergie. Ils sont un peu « laisser faire » aujourd'hui. Avant, on développait sa conscience politique à l'université ; aujourd'hui le gouvernement essaie de diriger les étudiants dans leurs études (la réforme du bacc) et essaie de réduire le nombre d'élèves qui vont à l'université.

Pour JP, la France a une histoire et une tradition de révolte qui doit continuer. Il a nommé comme exemple la Révolution Française (1789), le Front Populaire (1936-1938) —gouvernement socialiste), le mai 1968, etc. Il observe que dans toutes les révolutions ou grands mouvements sociaux il y a des morts. Il croit que cette lutte contre les politiques de droite de Macron est une révolution, et il s'attend aux morts. **(Influence of the history of socialist movements in France)**

## **SUBJECTIVE NORMS AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF NORMATIVE INFLUENCE**

Selon JP, l'identité / la conscience collective et l'esprit individuel sont inséparables. Mais en général, on a d'abord un esprit individuel, qui se nourrit des livres et des philosophies, et qui plus tard devient une conscience collective. Mais, il note qu'il ne faut pas se noyer dans la collectivité.

JP est plus conscient de son identité collective pendant la grève et la manif. Quand il participe aux manifs, il est non seulement pour l'UNEDIC mais aussi pour le SNCF, les étudiants, et tous les autres organismes présents—la clé est « la convergence des luttes ». Il a une identification collective avec les autres manifestants. Il éprouve une émotion exaltante pendant la grève—le phénomène de groupe, la conscience collective. **(Macro-level norms, feeling as if becoming part of the collective group, emotions of exaltation.)**

Avant, JP se croyait seul dans ses opinions, et cela lui fait plaisir d'avoir trouvé des gens qui partagent ses idées, et ce sont surtout ses amis au théâtre avec qui ils vont en grève ou en manifestation ensemble. **(Interpersonal level norms, finding friends who share his opinions to go on strike together.)**

### **Left and Right Wing politics in France:**

La gauche pense d'abord à la collectivité.

La France a eu pour la plupart un gouvernement de droite, malgré les efforts du Front Populaire et d'autres mouvements de gauche, jusqu'à François Mitterrand. Mais il y a eu beaucoup de luttes menées par la gauche.

## Interview with VD

### Strike experience

Avant 2016, il était « révolutionnaire » avec des amis, mais il ne participait pas aux manifs car il ne s'identifiait pas à un seul organisme présent dans les manifs. Depuis 2016, avec l'apparence du cortège de tête (pour les manifestants sans affiliation), il commence à participer aux grèves et aux manifestations. Il y va seul en général. Il fait des grèves et des manifs pour beaucoup de causes ; pour le moment il s'engage surtout pour refuser la loi ORE (la réforme de du bacc).

### Defining Strikes

Bloquer la fac pour VD est à la fois une forme de manifestation et de grève. Il s'agit de bloquer la production des savoirs.

Cependant, pendant le blocage, on enseigne des savoirs qu'on n'enseigne pas normalement dans les universités. Par exemple, les professeurs qui soutiennent le blocage enseignent l'histoire sur la Commune (1871) qui est l'inspiration pour beaucoup de grévistes étudiants.

### Motivations—SUBJECTIVE NORMS OR NORMATIVE BELIEFS

Pour VD, une grande motivation de faire la grève et de manifester, c'est de recréer l'image de la Commune—une société égalitaire, basée sur la fraternité, où il n'y a pas de différence de classe ni d'hierarchie. VD s'appelle un « utopiste ». Sa société idéale est fondée sur la coopération au lieu de la compétition. Pendant la Commune, il y avait des universités gratuites où on donnait aussi les cours de nuit pour les ouvriers. Aujourd'hui il existe des initiatives pour recréer cette sorte d'université—un acte contre la loi ORE selon laquelle les universités deviennent plus sélectives et exclusives. **(Emulating the history of Paris Commune in French history)**

VD est surtout motivé par son rêve d'une société égalitaire et utopiste. Il voit notre génération comme « une génération romantique ». Il donne un exemple : les jeunes aujourd'hui travaillent surtout pour leur plaisir ; au contraire, la génération avant nous travaillait majoritairement pour le salaire. Par conséquent, les jeunes aujourd'hui ont des rêves et le courage de mettre en action leurs rêves. **(Young people today are brave enough to pursue their dreams.)**

La participation en grève lui permet de mieux comprendre les manifestants venants des différents milieux, et de changer ses points de vue. Par exemple, au début, il était contre les casseurs. Au fur et à mesure, il arrive à considérer le fait de casser les choses comme une manière unique d'exprimer la colère. **(Taking the perspective of people coming from different social class.)**

Sa participation dans les manifs lui permet de préciser ses pensées, de « mettre un mot sur les problèmes sociaux ». En parlant de la collectivité, VD trouve que pendant la manifestation, il faut agir sur les échelles personnelles et sociales. Il lutte pour ses rêves personnels, mais aussi pour les autres—la convergence des luttes. De toute façon, l'important est de politiser les gens, et une grande partie de l'éducation politique se fait à l'université. (Pour VD, tout peut être politisé. Avoir une opinion est la base de la politique). **(Expected result of going on strike for individual and greater good of the society)**

#### **Motivations—MORAL NORMS AND ATTITUDES/BEHAVIORAL BELIEFS**

Un des buts de se mettre en grève pour VD est la cassure des classes. Les différentes classes sont comme des mondes parallèles. Il est important de faciliter les échanges parmi de différentes classes sociales pour atteindre une société sans classe. En fait, VD cherche à avoir des échanges avec les manifestants venant des différentes classes sociales—d'autres étudiants, des ouvriers, des cheminots, etc. Le problème c'est que, en communiquant avec ces derniers, il s'est rendu compte que tous ne partagent les mêmes valeurs. Les membres des organismes constituent par les ouvriers, comme Justice pour Adama, ne pensent pas au niveau macro du développement social. Souvent, ils ne manifestent que pour la revendication de leurs propres droits. **(Expected result : break class structures, revendication of personal rights)**

Malheureusement, ceux qui viennent manifester sont déjà beaucoup plus conscients politiquement que la plupart des ouvriers. Une grande partie des gens issus de milieux moins favorisés n'ont même pas la conscience d'aller manifester. Ils acceptent simplement leurs situations. VD croit que c'est dur de « politiser » ces derniers car ils n'ont pas le temps ni l'énergie de se battre contre la société dont leur survie dépend.

Ainsi, VD lutte aussi pour ceux qui n'ont pas nécessairement la conscience politique et sociale de

lutter pour eux-mêmes. **(We should speak for those whose voices are les heard.)**

Par exemple, la loi ORE vise à sélectionner les étudiants selon le mérite. Mais VD trouve que le système de mérite ne marche pas dans l'éducation supérieure : il faut avoir accès aux ressources académiques pour obtenir plus de « mérite », mais selon la loi ORE, seulement ceux qui ont déjà beaucoup de mérite peuvent avoir accès à de telles ressources—c'est un paradoxe. VD trouve qu'il est nécessaire que les gens plus privilégiés comme lui-même luttent pour les droits des autres, pour que le système devienne un jour plus juste pour tout le monde.

VD est d'accord qu'il existe de différentes classes. Issu d'une famille de « la classe moyenne aisée », il reconnaît ses privilèges, mais il va toujours « dans le sens le plus juste » pour construire une société sans classe.

Pour VD, les casseurs sont aussi la « preuve de l'inégalité » sociale. Beaucoup de manifestants qui n'ont pas accès à l'éducation supérieure n'ont pas encore développé des principes politiques ou des idéologies sociales. Mais ils savent qu'ils sont en colère, et ils veulent s'exprimer.

### **SUBJECTIVE NORMS—Emotions**

La ferveur : tout le monde chante ensemble, et il éprouve le sentiment de faire partie de quelque chose d'important.

La peur : la répression policière fait peur.

La colère : contre le système injuste, et aussi contre la répression policière.

La joie : chaque manif est une petite victoire d'avoir rassemblé des gens qui luttent côte à côte même s'ils ont des valeurs différentes. **(Joy due to collective success)**

### **Problems today**

Le gouvernement n'écoute pas les manifestants. Les médias parlent de la violence mais jamais des demandes concrètes des manifestants. Souvent, les médias parlent de la violence des casseurs en enlevant l'élément politique, et ainsi « réduit » l'importance de la manifestation.

## Interview with EG

### Strike experience

Quand elle était au lycée, quelques événements sociaux injustes ont incité Elisabeth à participer aux manifestations. Par exemple, l'expulsion de deux élèves étrangers et la mort d'un homme à ZAD (zone à défendre) par un policier, etc. A la fac, elle a fait partie du syndicat solidaire. Elle participe aux manifs de toutes sortes, pour la politique de gauche, pour l'écologie, pour le féminisme, etc. Pour le moment, elle s'engage beaucoup dans les blocages des partiels dans les universités.

### Defining strikes

La manifestation pour EG est un moyen parmi d'autres d'exprimer la revendication.

Une manifestation est comme un spectacle. Elle est plus symbolique qu'une grève qui signifie plutôt un blocage économique. EG fait souvent la grève générale car elle croit à la convergence des luttes.

Des grévistes sont contre l'expression de la « gréviculture ». Pour eux, considérer la grève comme une culture ou une tradition en France dépolitise et ainsi réduit l'importance de la grève. **(Admit to the importance of French history, but refusing to call it the “strike cultural tradition” since that depoliticizes strikes)**

### Motivations—NORMATIVE BELIEFS OR SUBJECTIVE NORMS

EG est motivée par la volonté de changement. La répression policière a radicalisé les manifestants pour aller en grève ou en manif.

Elle veut surtout faire la connaissance des gens qui partagent ses idées et ses réseaux sociaux— « Effet de potes ». **(Interpersonal-level norms, always goes on strike with friends)**

Emotion de l'euphorie : il y a une atmosphère euphorique quand on chante ensemble **(euphoric feelings in the collective atmosphere)**

Emotion du stress et la peur : la violence de la police et même de la manifestation est toujours stressante.

Pendant une manifestation, EG éprouve la « camaraderie » avec des autres manifestants qu'elle



ne connaissait pas. C'est une solidarité qui s'est formée en face de la répression commune.

**(Macro-level norms, feelings of commoraderie)**

Néanmoins, en général elle va aux manifs avec des amis. Elle a essayé d'organiser quelques blocages à la Sorbonne pour annuler les partiels. Pour EG, l'université peut être considérée comme une « industrie » qui produit des diplômés. Donc quand on annule les partiels, on bloque la production des diplômés et ainsi fait la grève contre la sélection universitaire injuste sous la loi ORE. Elle se croit un leader « démocratique » : avant chaque blocage, elle organise une discussion ou un vote, et le blocage commence seulement si la majorité des étudiants sont pour l'annulation des partiels. Elle aime faciliter les discussions car cela aide tout le monde à trouver sa place.

**Motivation—ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORAL BELIEFS**

L'organisation de ces grèves / blocages l'a aidée à préciser ses opinions, à développer sa confiance en soi et sa confiance en sa cause de manifester. Avant, elle croyait des fois que cela sert à rien de faire la grève. Ayant de plus en plus de confiance, elle est de plus en plus sûre qu'au long terme, les grèves et les manifestations lui permettent de gagner le savoir-faire pour réaliser des changements importants à l'avenir. **(Expected results: clarification of her opinions, developing confidence and obtaining skills for effecting changes on a bigger scale)**

## Appendix C Strike Scenario and Nudges

### **Control**

*US version:*

“Imagine that you are an employee at the Marriott Hotel in San Francisco, and there is another upcoming strike in the next two weeks--demanding adequate pay, legal contracts, and improved working conditions.”

*France version:*

« Imaginez que vous êtes un travailleur au Park Hyatt Vendôme à Paris, et on compte organiser une grève dans les deux semaines à venir pour réclamer d'être embauché directement par l'hôtel afin d'augmenter les salaires et améliorer les conditions de travail. »

### **Social Nudge**

*US version:*

“Imagine that you are an employee at the Marriott Hotel in San Francisco, and there is another upcoming strike in the next two weeks--demanding adequate pay, legal contracts, and improved working conditions. Data has shown that up till now, 75% of the workers in Marriott in San Francisco went on strike during the past two weeks.”

*France version:*

« Imaginez que vous êtes un travailleur au Park Hyatt Vendôme à Paris, et on compte organiser une grève dans les deux semaines à venir pour réclamer d'être embauché directement par l'hôtel afin d'augmenter les salaires et améliorer les conditions de travail. Des données montrent que jusqu'à maintenant, 75% des travailleurs à l'hôtel Park Hyatt à Paris ont fait la grève pendant les dernières deux semaines.»

### **Moral nudge**

*US version:*

“Imagine that you are an employee at the Marriott Hotel in San Francisco, and there is another upcoming strike in the next two weeks--demanding adequate pay, legal contracts, and improved working conditions. Indeed, we have the moral responsibility to participate in movements that promote social well-being.”

*France version:*

« Imaginez que vous êtes un travailleur au Park Hyatt Vendôme à Paris, et on compte organiser une grève dans les deux semaines à venir pour réclamer d'être embauché directement par l'hôtel afin d'augmenter les salaires et améliorer les conditions de travail. C'est vrai, on a la responsabilité morale de participer aux mouvements sociaux pour le bien-être de notre société. »

## Appendix D Measures

### **Intentions**

#### *US Version:*

Continuing to imagine that you are an employee of the Marriott Hotel in San Francisco where there is an upcoming strike in the next 2 weeks, which of the following statements best describes your intentions?

- A. I would not likely participate in the strike.
- B. I would be likely to go on strike only if my co-worker(s) [the name(s) of co-worker(s) listed above] were planning to participate in the strike.
- C. I would be likely to go on strike if the majority of other employees at the Marriott in San Francisco were planning to go on strike.
- D. I would go on strike regardless of what anyone else was planning on doing.

#### *France Version :*

Continuez à imaginer que vous travailler pour l'hôtel Park Hyatt Vendôme à Paris, et qu'on compte organiser une grève dans les deux semaines à venir. Quelle réponse décrit le plus précisément votre intention?

- A. Je ne compte pas me mettre en grève.
- B. Je vais probablement me mettre en grève [prénoms des collègues notés ci-dessus] aurions l'intention de se mettrent en grève.
- C. Je vais probablement me mettre en grève si la majorité des employés à l'hôtel Park Hyatt auraient l'intention de se mettre en grève.
- D. Je vais probablement me mettre en grève indépendamment de ce que quelqu'un d'autre avait l'intention de faire

### **Subjective norms and attitudes**

#### *US Version:*

Continuing to imagine that you are an employee of the Marriott Hotel in San Francisco where there is an upcoming strike in the next 2 weeks, please read each statement below and indicate your level of agreement.

1. My participation in the strike would **not** contribute to providing workers' adequate pay, legal contracts and improved working conditions.
2. My participation in this strike would support the history of the democratic protests in the US.
3. My participation in this strike would **not** contribute to the greater good of society.
4. My participation in this strike would **not** contribute to my personal well-being.
5. Most people who are important to me would believe that I should go on strike for the Marriott Hotel.
6. Most people who are important to me would **not** approve of my going on strike for the Marriott Hotel.
7. I would want to go on strike for the Marriott Hotel with all of the employees who went on strike during the past two weeks.
8. I would want to go on strike for the Marriott Hotel with my co-worker(s) [names of co-workers listed above].
9. I believe that going on strike in this situation is the **wrong** thing to do.
10. I feel that most people in society would agree that going on strike in this particular situation, is the right thing to do.
11. My decision about whether to go on strike at the Marriott Hotel in the next two weeks would be:  
*Very foolish; Foolish; Somewhat foolish; Neutral; Somewhat wise; Wise; Very wise*
12. My decision about whether to go on strike at the Marriott Hotel in the next two weeks would be:  
*Very negative; Negative; Somewhat negative; Neutral; Somewhat positive; Positive; Very positive*
13. My decision about whether to go on strike at the Marriott Hotel in the next two weeks would be:

*Very punishing; Punishing; Somewhat punishing; Neutral; Somewhat rewarding; Rewarding; Very rewarding*

#### *France Version:*

Continuez à imaginer que vous travailler pour l'hôtel Park Hyatt Vendôme à Paris, et qu'on compte organiser une grève dans les deux semaines à venir. Lisez chaque déclaration ci-dessous et indiquer votre niveau d'accord.

1. Le fait de me mettre en grève **ne signifie pas** que l'hôtel acceptera de fournir aux travailleurs un salaire adéquat, des contrats légaux et de meilleures conditions de travail.
2. Le fait de me mettre en grève contribuerait à l'histoire des mouvements sociaux en France.
3. Le fait de me mettre en grève **ne contribuerait pas** au bien commun de la société.
4. Le fait de me mettre en grève ne contribuerait pas à mon bien-être personnel.
5. La plupart des gens qui sont importants pour moi auraient estimé que je devrais faire grève pour l'hôtel Park Hyatt.
6. La plupart des gens qui sont importants pour moi **ne seraient pas** en accord avec ma décision de me mettre en grève pour l'hôtel Park Hyatt.
7. Je voudrais me mettre en grève pour l'hôtel Park Hyatt avec tous les travailleurs de mon hôtel qui ont fait la grève au cours des deux dernières semaines.
8. Je voudrais me mettre en grève pour l'hôtel Park Hyatt avec [prénoms des collègues notés ci-dessus].
9. Je crois que faire la grève dans cette situation est la **mauvaise** chose à faire.
10. Je crois que la plupart des gens dans la société sont convaincus qu'il est bien de faire grève dans cette situation.
11. Pour moi, la décision de me mettre en grève pour le Park Hyatt pendant les deux prochaines semaines sera:

*Très insensée; Insensée; Plutôt insensée; Neutre; Plutôt sage; Sage; Très Sage*

12. Pour moi, la décision de me mettre en grève pour le Park Hyatt pendant les deux prochaines semaines sera:

*Très négative; Négative; Plutôt négative; Neutre; Plutôt positive; Positive; Très positive*

13. Pour moi, la décision de me mettre en grève pour le Park Hyatt pendant les deux prochaines semaines sera:

*Très pénible; Pénible; Plutôt pénible; Neutre; Plutôt gratifiante; Gratifiante; Très gratifiante*

[Items 1-10 were rated on the following scale:

Strongly Disagree; Somewhat disagree; Disagree; Neutral; Somewhat agree; Agree; Strongly agree]

[Items for Attitude: 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13; Items for Subjective Norms: 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10.]

### **Singelis Self-Construal Scale (1994)**

The full scale was adapted from Singelis, T. M. (1994). The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), 580–591. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167294205014>. The French version was back translated.

### **Control Checks**

#### *US Version:*

1. Pensez à la situation de la grève à l'hôtel Park Hyatt décrite dans cette enquête. À quel point pensez-vous que la situation est réaliste?

*Very unrealistic; Unrealistic; Somewhat unrealistic; Neutral; Somewhat realistic; Realistic; Very realistic*

2. The hypothetical scenario presented earlier is actually based on a real strike that occurred last year. Had you heard about this strike?

A. *Yes*

B. *No*

#### *France Version:*

1. Pensez à la situation de la grève à l'hôtel Park Hyatt décrite dans cette enquête. À quel point pensez-vous que la situation est réaliste?

*Très irréaliste; Irréaliste; Plutôt irréaliste; Neutre; Plutôt réaliste; Réaliste; Très réaliste*

2. Cette situation présentée est en fait basée sur une grève réelle qui avait eu lieu l'année dernière. Est-ce que vous l'avez entendu dire?

A. *Oui*

B. *No*