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Reading: (In)accurate Intuition: Fast Reasoning in Decision Making

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(In)accurate Intuition: Fast Reasoning in Decision Making

Authors:

Michalina Andrzejewska,

PL
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Dilara Berkay ,

TR
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Sophie Dreesmann,

NL
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Jonas Haslbeck,

AT
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Daisy Mechelmans,

BE
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Sarah Furlan

IT
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Abstract

Dual-process theories postulate a distinction between fast, automatic, intuitive and error-prone (Type 1) versus slow, controlled, deliberate and analytic (Type 2) processes. When less time is available, performance is predicted to be based on low-effort Type 1 processes, which leads to an increase in biases. Using variations of the gambler’s fallacy task with or without time pressure, we will test whether Type 1 processes are indeed more error-prone than Type 2 processes and how this discrepancy is modulated by individual differences in impulsivity and cognitive abilities. It is hypothesized that i) people with high expertise levels will perform equally well both under and without time pressure; and ii) people higher on cognitive abilities will perform equally well under time pressure and without time pressure, unlike those with lower cognitive abilities.

How to Cite: Andrzejewska, M. et al., (2013). (In)accurate Intuition: Fast Reasoning in Decision Making. Journal of European Psychology Students. 4(2), pp.9–15. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/jeps.bf
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Published on 15 Sep 2013.
Peer Reviewed

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